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Among other  current fields of  research for the  „next“ Internet,  the  Brain-Com-
puter-Interfaces (BCIs) seem to be the one with the deepest ontological implications:  
If this technology is further developed, the perception of what we call „Cyberspace“  
or „Virtual Reality“ will be fundamentally different to our actual understanding.  
Instead of solely addressing two of the five senses (ear and eye), with BCIs all five  
human senses could be reached, and this not via  any external  transmitters like  
monitors or speakers. Restricted to science fiction literature so far, however, several  
remarkable breakthroughs have been made with BCIs in the recent past.  Within  
some years  of  advancement,  this  technology  will  easily  be  able  to  simulate  our  
world  or  any  other  (compare  „The  Matrix“  or  „eXistenZ“)  just  as  good  as  a  
nowadays state of the art CGI-movie. For me, as a philosopher and professional web  
developer, the key questions related to this topic are as follows: How does a BCI  
work and what kind of neurological or psychological risks are to be expected? Who  
would and who should control these upcoming cyberspaces and its underlying tech-
nologies and standards (such as protocols, compatibility, etc.)? And last but not  
least: Are the transhumanist beliefs regarding an evolutionary/technological singu-
larity due to the inter-connection of human minds (a very distant version of Hegels  
„Weltgeist“) a blessing or a rather curse?
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1. INTRODUCTION
Ten years ago, when the movie „Matrix“ was released, the idea of a fully 
simulated world was nothing new at all, but it was the first time, this topic 
was not only discussed by philosophers of mind and science fiction fans. 
Within this last decade several remarkable developments took place in the 
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field  of  neuro-cybernetics.  So this  issue  challenges  our society  now once 
again, but this time with a more actual attitude.
The development of so-called Brain-Computer-Interfaces (BCIs) has now 
reached prototype state and could be ready for a human assembly within 
some years as far as this didn’t  happen already. This progress will  likely 
change the way we look at the difference between virtuality and reality and 
their ontological meaning as well as our understanding of the Internet. But 
it  also  contains  enormous  risks  in  varying  fields  of  society  and science: 
From a constant insecurity of technical errors, across hostile attacks or hacks 
into a logged-on user, to already known problems of Internet or game ad-
diction – the range of possible issues is nearly unmanageable. Another in-
teresting point may also be the philosophical implications of these develop-
ments: The definition of the „I“ will merge more with virtual characters as 
their player/controller is no longer separated from its alter ego’s body, but 
feels like being „inside“ it. This change of the phenomenological perception 
of one’s avatar could lead into a basically new form of a human’s self-dis-
closure. As a second philosophical impact, the socializing and the pairing of 
our species could also change dramatically. When connected together via 
BCIs, the terms „teamwork“ or „couple“ could change its meaning insofar 
as the conjoined humans might experience themselves rather as „one“ than 
as a group of different beings.
It seems clear that a technological evolution of mind-attached machines 
will reach us sooner or later. The important issues we face should therefore 
be discussed before this change of cyberspace and its ontology. In this paper 
I would like to give an overview of the forthcoming technology and its pro-
totypes, the possible fields of problems based upon this developments and 
at last a comparison between Hegels idea of the „Weltgeist“ and a potential 
„Internet of the minds“.
2. NEURALS AND CHIPS: 
WHAT BCIS ARE AND HOW THEY WORK
The story of prosthetics is most likely as old as the history of the human 
race itself. Since ancient times, lost or damaged body parts have been fixed 
with different artificial replacements. A substantial change occurred in the 
20th century, when auto mechanical attachments were used instead of just 
mechanical ones. These advancements culminated in the technology of cy-
bernetics,  for  example  with  cochlear-implants  for  aurally  handicapped, 
heart pacemakers or artificial bowels.
Although these implants automatically work for the body attached to 
and keep it alive or its parts working, in most cases they don’t interact with 
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it – which means a control over this part by the body or mind or even  a 
feedback signal back to it. These further steps of „prosthestation” have yet 
proceeded in the last years. Some almost creepy breakthroughs have been 
made, regarding the interaction of human nerves and cybernetic implants 
or animal neurals and controlled computers.
The mode of operation of an invasive BCI is as simple to understand as it 
is complex in his design and implementation: A chip smaller than a coin is 
surgically implanted to the motor cortex, connecting at least a dozen, but 
mostly about 100 or more silicon electrodes to neurons. After the output sig-
nals are adjusted to the user, a computer program evaluates them and trans-
mits the compiled orders to any external computer program (e.g. a desktop 
or email program), or to a virtual keyboard for typing letters or to a robotic 
hand.1
As examples may be mentioned the works of John Donoghue and his 
team, who published their paper about Neuromotor prostheses (NMPs) in 
nature back in 2006.2 Their research – basically focused on to humans with 
paralysis  –  also  included mind-controlled computer  programs as  well  as 
„operated devices such as a television, even while conversing.“3 Based upon 
this study the Pittsburgh University published results this year concerning a 
monkey  controlling  a  robotic  arm  via  an  implanted  chip.4 Related  re-
searches have also been reported in nature in 2006.5
It is obvious, that this technology could be used to help paralyzed people 
more than with any other prosthesis ever since. Past, present and future re-
searches also focus on other „interface regions“ of the brain, for example to 
restore  blind  peoples  eyesight  or  to  help  patients  suffering  from  the 
„locked-in syndrome“ to interact with the outside world. The first patient, 
who was able to communicate again via a BCI was Johnny Ray back in 
1998.6
Another more recent example of nerve-computer interaction is the sens-
itive robotic hand developed by researchers at Lund University in Sweden 
and Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna in Italy: Robin af Ekenstam, whose right 
hand had to be amputated due to cancer was given a new robotic hand this 
1 John Donoghue. et al. 2002, ‘Connecting cortex to machines: recent advances in brain inter-
facses’, Nature neuroscience supplement, vol. 5, pp. 1085-1088.
2 Hochberg, Leigh R. et al. 2006, ‘Neuronal ensemble control of prosthetic devices by a hu-
man with tetraplegia’, Nature, vol. 442, pp. 164-171.
3 Ibid.
4 Schwartz,  Andrew B.  et  al.  2008,  ‘Cortical  control  of  a  prosthetic  arm for  self-feeding’, 
Nature, vol. 453, pp. 1098-1101.
5 Santhanam,  Gopal  et  al.  2006,  ‘A  high-performance  brain–computer  interface’,  Nature, 
vol.442, pp. 195-198.
6 Kennedy, P.R. et al. 1998, ‘Restoration of neural output from a paralyzed patient by a direct 
brain connection’, Neuroreport, vol. 9, pp. 1707-11. 
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year, which not only can be fully controlled by him, but also sends feed-
back-signals to his nerves.7 Unlike other common limb-prosthetics, the im-
plant of the „Smart Hand Project“ recovers also Ekenstams sense of touch, 
not just his ability to grasp.
3. BCIS FOR THE MASSES?
The Smart Hand Project took about 10 years of development and has now 
finally reached prototype level. As the improvements of Nerve-Computer- 
and Brain-Computer-Interfaces seem to become faster every year, the ques-
tion occurs if this technology would expand into the mass market of gaming 
and virtualization (e.g. as a next type of cinema after the 3D-movie hype 
nowadays).
An argument pro are the developments of personal computers and mo-
bile phones from the eighties to the nineties: Back in the 1980s, computers 
were mostly used by scientists and mobile phones mainly by top-level-man-
agers, but this changed within ten years as we all know to a broad usage of 
this technologies and its deep implications for human society.
On the other hand, there’s a big difference between the BCI’s and mobile 
phones. The latter are not implanted in a human’s body, but only attached 
to it externally. Computers, to bring a more distant example, are mostly op-
erated in front of the user, not via direct implants, but using monitor and 
speakers, keyboard and mouse, camera and microphone. So an implant rep-
resents a greater extend of cyborgification than these other devices do and 
this on various levels, such as follow:
• First  of all,  an implant  has to be built  into a human’s body, and 
therefore a surgery is necessary. This leads to a classical problem in 
the treatment vs. enhancement-debate, which can be summarized in 
the principle  of  „primum nil  nocere“:  As an operation is  always 
closely connected to various risks, then why should a doctor agree 
to „harm“ a patient (even on the patients demand)?
• Also, an implant cannot be detached from or changed by its carrier 
as easily as a mobile phone. Every hardware-upgrade would cause 
another surgical  intervention and every operation – especially  on 
the brain – involves the risks again and again.
• The BCI would not just be its owners add-on, e.g. like a mp3 player, 
but a part of himself, just as a pacemaker and therefore change the 
definition of a „human body“ into a more computerized way.
7 Cipriani, C. et al. 2008, ‘On the shared control of an EMG controlled prosthetic hand: ana-
lysis of user-prosthesis interaction’, IEEE Transactions on Robotics, vol. 24, pp. 170-184.
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• Speaking of BCIs, not only the body, but also the mind of the cy-
borg would be different to „usual“ human minds: If the BCIs soft-
ware  would be able to give its carrier supernatural skills he usually 
does not have, like a photographic memory or the ability to com-
pute numbers much quicker than any „normal“ human, these skills 
would  surely  retroact  to  the  cyborgs  mind  and  change  also  its 
psyche. 
Nevertheless, some of these arguments can also be disproved easily: Surgic-
al interventions to make the body „better“ are widely accepted in several 
cultures, from plastic surgeries in western and Asian societies to piercings 
and tattoos in so called „primitive“ cultures or postmodern subcultures. So 
it is imaginable that a BCI operation one day becomes as usual as breast 
augmentations or nipple piercings today.
4. POSSIBLE RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES
Besides the pro and contra arguments about the implantation of BCIs in 
general,  many mischiefs  and risks  appear  not  until  then.  These  possible 
problems can be mainly summarized the following issues:
• The behaviour of the user could be changed without his agreement. 
He or she could become an unconscious slave for hackers, compan-
ies or security agencies.
• The border between reality and virtuality would fade even more 
than for today’s Internet and gaming addicted. An important point 
here  is  again  the  likely  change of  the  ontology of  the  virtuality: 
With every advancement and every additional grade of perfection 
the simulation would be more difficult to identify as such. Strongly 
addicted computer game players yet often tend to confuse reality 
and virtuality, if a BCI user would really feel his avatars body in a 
simulation,  the risk of a total loss of self consciousness would be 
much higher than today.
• In a further developed state neuro-implants could be used to switch 
a human mind from one body to another or even out of the bodily 
existence into a solely virtual one. Juristic implications for this kind 
of „mind shift“ are unpredictable so far, as the personal identity of 
a human being would not be given, as we know it anymore.
• Hackers  or  government  agencies  could try to  gather  and misuse 
personal thoughts,  memories or other information.  Today we are 
aware about computer viruses, Trojans, phishing- and spam emails 
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or hacked websites and databases. In a BCI society not our credit 
card or bank account numbers could be the desired items of hostile 
subjects, but information far beyond today’s range of data mining. 
• Neuro-implants could be damaged through a hostile attack or vir-
us, a denial-of-service attack or an overload of the users mind could 
lead to neurological defects or even death.
• The brain of a BCI user could be damaged not only while its im-
plantation, but also during „runtime“, e.g. during a server malfunc-
tion or server breakdown.
• BCIs  for  mass-produce  would  be  developed  by  bioinformatical 
companies who most likely also would control the servers or know 
the vulnerabilities of protocols etc. A protection against this kind of 
threat is open standards and a worldwide organization for all tech-
nical and medical specifications, such as the World Wide Web Con-
sortium (W3C) today.
• As a special philosophical issue, the autonomy of the subject [Auto-
nomie  des Subjekts – annotation] by Kant must here be instanced. 
As it is one of the basic principles of modern definition of a humans 
political and individual rights it could lose it’s imperative character 
– given to anyone by birth or at least by full intellectual up growth. 
If a human being could not be looked up upon as autonomous/self-
governed, the definition of the subject would have to be rethought of.
Furthermore  to  all  these  risks  also  great  opportunities  are  possible  with 
these technological advancements (possibilities for the computer and enter-
tainment industries not included):
• The working process within teams would most likely change to  a 
real teamwork, not just the combined single works of several people. 
This could lead to a next „intelligence explosion“ far beyond the 
one our society experiences since the beginning of the Internet age.
• As mentioned before also much closer relations between couples, 
friends or families could occur: Being connected via BCIs these hu-
mans could lose a big part of their individuality and mind-collect-
ives could act as one. This point is intensively to discuss whether 
it’s a pro or a contra argument.
• Police, the judicial system and terror defense would have a techno-
logy  to read the victims or the suspect’s minds. The advantage to 
nowadays court procedures is obvious at first, but as noted before, 
also this kind of mind-evidences could be manipulated.
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• Within this  issue,  also the „right to silence” also has to be men-
tioned: This principle of jurisdiction (nemo tenetur se ipsum accus-
are) is amongst others also part in the „European Convention on 
Human Rights” and stands as legal right to everyone who is  ac-
cused in any trial. If a court is trying to avoid this right by the usage 
of BCIs, this would be a massive violation of human rights and also 
of legal practice so far.
To assure the safety of Brain-Computer-Interfaces, ethical standards estab-
lished years ago have to remain valid:
The Belmont Report enunciates three basic ethical standards for the con-
duct of human research. The first, respect for persons, incorporates the idea 
that individuals are autonomous agents and should be free to make their 
own choice regarding participation after being given a full understanding of 
the risks and benefits. The second, beneficence, obligates the investigator to 
act in a way that will maximize benefit to the individual volunteer and/or 
the greater society while simultaneously minimizing the risk of harm. The 
third standard, justice,  obligates the investigator to design studies so that 
the benefits and burdens of research are shared in a just way. An ethicist 
should be involved in the earliest phases of any human research developing 
or testing invasive BCI methods.8
5. OUTLOOK: WELTGEIST 2.0 – AN INTERNET OF MINDS?
Virtuality has emerged in the last years more and more, especially through 
the so called „Web 2.0“ appearance. A lot of people working in intellectual, 
creative or office jobs are connected to the whole world via websites as face-
book or twitter or by programs like skype all day long, certainly also per 
„classical“ communication technologies such as telephone, sms or email.
With BCIs and appropriate software, another boost of virtualization is 
imminent. A direct connection to another human mind or even several oth-
er minds as well is likely going to change the way we communicate strong-
ly.  Thoughts have to be transformed into spoken or written language since 
the first days of mankind. Language and its abstraction, reception and trans-
lation has therefore become one of our species main characteristics ever since. 
This would change dramatically, if the technology of BCIs could transmit our 
thoughts and feelings directy. It is possible, that even pure information of all 
kinds, knowledge, skills could be shared from one human to another within 
no time – just as simple as we share mp3s, movies or software today.
8 Wolpaw, Jonathan R. et al. 2000, ’Brain–Computer Interface Technology: A Review of the First 
International Meeting’, IEEE Transactions On Rehabilitation Engineering, vol. 8, no. 2, p. 169.
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In Hegels magnum opus „The Phenomenology of Mind“ he elaborates 
the idea of the Weltgeist (world-spirit), a metaphysical construction for the 
idealistic explanation of all being. The mind itself starts – following Hegel – 
at the point of consciousness, right before self-consciousness. From reason 
to spirit, herein defined as ethics, morals and culture, Hegel completes his 
system with religion, which itself is totally different from common defini-
tions and could rather be referred to as „all-over-spirituality“.
In the last chapter „Absolute Knowledge“ Hegel works out the idea of a 
final self-consciousness of the Weltgeist through a more and more growing 
knowledge since the age of Enlightenment. He describes the way from con-
sciousness to (what he understands by) religion for the concept of know-
ledge itself again, as the synthesis and dialectical endpoint of history of the 
spirit. Hegel quotes:
Diese letzte  Gestalt  des Geistes,  der Geist,  der seinem vollständigen und 
wahren Inhalte zugleich die Form des Selbsts gibt, und dadurch seinen Be-
griff ebenso realisiert, als  er in dieser Realisierung in seinem Begriffe bleibt, ist  
das absolute Wissen;9
(This last embodiment of Spirit – Spirit which at once gives its complete and 
true content the form of self, and thereby realizes its notion, and in doing so 
remains within its own notion – this is Absolute Knowledge.)10
In Hegels definition of the Weltgeist, that cannot fulfill the hermeneutic 
circle as well as the Geist of one individual does: The reason why is because 
the Weltgeist  is  not able to self-consciousness,  which is  the beginning of 
Hegel  hermenteutics.  Its  „process  of  knowledge“ is  „the transforming of 
that  inherent  nature [An sich,  annotation] into explicitness  [Für sich,  an-
notation], of Substance into Subject“.11 As Hegels world-spirit is not a tar-
get-orientated one – in opposite to Schopenhauers Weltwille – it cannot be-
come aware of itself at the end of the hermeneutic circle. This also implic-
ates for the spirit, that this cannot complete itself unless it is thought togeth-
er with the Weltgeist. Hegel points it out as follows:
Eh daher der Geist nicht an sich, nicht als Weltgeist sich vollendet, kann er  
nicht als selbstbewußter Geist seine Vollendung erreichen. Der Inhalt der  
Religion spricht darum früher in der Zeit, als die Wissenschaft, es aus, was  
der Geist ist, aber diese ist allein sein wahres Wissen von ihm selbst.12
9 Hegel, G.W.F. [1807] 2003, Phänomenologie des Geistes, Reclam, Stuttgart, p. 558.
10 Hegel, G.W.F. 1998, Phenomenology Of Spirit, Motilal Banarsidass, India, p. 485.
11 Ibid.
12 Hegel, G.W.F. [1807] 2003, Phänomenologie des Geistes, Reclam, Stuttgart, p. 561.
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(Consequently, until Spirit completed itself in itself, until it has completed 
itself as a world-Spirit, it cannot reach its consummation as self-conscious 
Spirit. Therefore, the content of religion proclaims earlier in time than does 
Science what Spirit is, but only Science is its true knowledge of itself.)13
Finally, following Hegels completion, a scientific society leads directly to 
what he calls the Aboslute Knowledge.  Thinking of this as the last state of 
the Weltgeists journey as a self-unaware being by the use of its self-aware be-
ings (the human minds/spirits) today we could speak of the „Weltgeist 2.0“, 
which emerges among our technological horizon through BCI prototypes.
The age of an interconnection of human minds awaits us with a lot of 
questions and dreams. The transhumanistic denomination of the so-called 
„Singularists“ beliefs in a technological singularity – a point where a lot of 
years  of  advancement  are  made  within  one  second.  Their  belief  mostly 
refers to an artificial intelligence to reach this point, but it seems logical that 
this could also be reached by a huge amount of human minds connected to-
gether. For example a group of scientists works together on one problem. 
Today they would gather their information or run their tests, share them, 
compare  them,  discusses  them  and  finally  after  some  days,  weeks  or 
months have at best some results. Although the gathered information usu-
ally were thoughts, it had to be transformed into language or data, spread 
around, retransformed into thoughts again, compared, reretransformed into 
language  and  so  on.  If  omitting  the  information-transformation  could 
shorten up the process of data sharing and –interpolation, the achievements 
could be made in no time, compared to now.
Nevertheless,  these  transhumanistic  dreams  are  rather  speculative: 
Today, no one knows how it would be to live in a world of interconnected 
minds,  nor can seariously  be spoken about a „singularistic  age”,  if  com-
puters or Brain-Computer-Interfaces aren’t that far developed yet.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper I tried to give a short overview of the main philosophical is-
sues  concerning  Brain-Computer-Interfaces.  It  could  be  shown  that  this 
technology is  now in a state of high functionality,  although it  is  still  not 
common in usage. We already know some problems that could occur when 
this technology reaches mass-production state, like medical or technical er-
rors,  hostile  attacks or hacks or even a change of consciousness  through 
technical abuse. Some other fields of problems we might face can hardly be 
13 Hegel, G.W.F. 1998, Phenomenology Of Spirit, Motilal Banarsidass, India, p. 488.
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discussed today, before this next fundamental change in human communic-
ation has finally been accomplished.
However, it seems clear to me that the progression of BCI technology 
will not be stopped and that we all will have to change (learn?) the way we 
communicate once more. As these changes will emerge rather slowly than 
quickly,  we  all  should  participate  in  the  forthcoming  discussions  about 
where this technology should lead us and how its underlying technologies 
and standards should be constructed.
Finally, some following questions remain to be asked: How would our 
understanding of the cyberspace change in the future, if we used BCIs in-
stead of PCs to communicate? Is a violation of our basic rights such as the 
right  to  silence  acceptable  for  the  prevention  of terroristic  attacks  or  for 
crime detection? And does a human have the duty to stay within his body 
and his given mind to avoid legal problems such as the shift of the personal 
identity?
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